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42 
The Problem of Line-Drawing 
Sarah B. Lawsky 
It cannot be that if two is few, three is not so likewise, nor that if 
two or three are few, four is not so; and so on up to ten. But two is 
few, therefore so also is ten. 
—Diogenes Laertius1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Quantitative Model for Measuring Line-Drawing Inequity,2 Bradley 
Borden tackles the extremely difficult problem of line-drawing: when two 
people or situations are similar, how can we justify treating them differently? 
Borden’s Article focuses on the inequity that he claims arises from 
subjecting some gains from real-estate sales to the higher ordinary income-
tax rate while taxing other real-estate gains as capital gains, subject to a 
lower rate. Borden presents a model that he suggests can be applied in many 
areas. Borden’s model—I will call it the “Inequity Model”—is not meant to 
predict outcomes or provide a causal explanation. Rather, this is the sort of 
model that, as I have described elsewhere,3 will be helpful to the extent it 
focuses or develops our intuitions or highlights previously overlooked 
questions or assumptions. 
In this brief response, I first describe the kind of fairness that the 
Inequity Model presents (not necessarily, as it turns out, line-drawing 
fairness), and then I explain why the Inequity Model as implemented in 
Borden’s Article does relate to line-drawing fairness. I raise some concerns 
about the Inequity Model as presented, and I highlight one of its larger 
problems by attempting to apply it to another area of law—speed limits. I 
conclude that while Borden’s Article takes a quantitative and possibly 
helpful approach to an important question, the Inequity Model falls short of 
the Article’s stated goals. 
 
  Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine, School of Law. Thanks to Pegah 
Ghaneian for truly excellent discussions and assistance. 
 1.  2 DIOGENES LAERTIUS, LIVES OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS, bk. VII, para. 83, at 191 
(G.P. Goold ed., R.D. Hicks trans., 8th prtg. 1979). 
 2. Bradley T. Borden, Quantitative Model for Measuring Line-Drawing Inequity, 98 IOWA L. 
REV. 971 (2013). 
 3. See Sarah B. Lawsky, How Tax Models Work, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1657 (2012). 
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II. DEFINING FAIRNESS 
The Inequity Model compares various taxpayers’ actual and normative 
tax liabilities.4 The Inequity Model takes a situation to be unfair to the 
extent that one person is treated more differently from his normative 
treatment than another person is treated differently from hers.5 “More 
differently” is defined in terms of difference, not ratio, and in terms of tax 
liability, not tax rate.6 The distance between various taxpayers’ situations 
matters only if that distance affects actual or normative tax liability. This 
makes sense, because if two taxpayers’ normative tax liabilities are very 
different, the taxpayers are not relevantly similar, even if the taxpayers 
appear close together on whatever is chosen as the model’s x-axis. 
This is clear from the alternate definition of what Borden calls “single-
reference-point inequity,” which “measures the extent to which the law 
treats two situations differently, disproportionately to their differences.”7 As 
the Article explains,8 for any two scenarios A and B, single-reference-point 
inequity simplifies to 
ฬ1 െ	 ሺܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܣ െ ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܤሻሺܰ݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅ݒ݁	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܣ െ ܰ݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅ݒ݁	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܤሻฬ	
For example, imagine there are only two people in the world, Andrew and 
Bella. Andrew’s normative tax liability is $800, but he is taxed $1000, and 
Bella’s normative tax liability is $100, but she is taxed $300. Under the 
Inequity Model, Andrew and Bella’s situation is perfectly fair, because the 
difference between their actual tax liabilities is $700, and the difference 
between their normative tax liabilities is $700: 
ฬ1 െ	 ሺܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܣ െ ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܤሻሺܰ݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅ݒ݁	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܣ െ ܰ݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅ݒ݁	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܤሻฬ ൌ	
ቚ1 െ	ଵ଴଴଴	ି	ଷ଴଴଼଴଴	ି	ଵ଴଴ ቚ ൌ 	 |1 െ 1	| ൌ 0		
 
 4. Borden, supra note 2, at 995. This is true notwithstanding the initially proposed 
“triangle method,” as Borden acknowledges. See id. at 998. The “triangle method” devolves into 
what we might call the “difference in lines method” because the two triangles Borden proposes 
comparing have the same base, and the area of a triangle equals ½ x base x height. So, if 
Triangle A and Triangle B have the same base, when you subtract the area of Triangle A from 
the area of Triangle B, and then divide by the area of Triangle B, the ½ coefficient and the base 
cancel out, leaving only a ratio of the heights. See id. at 998–1000 & nn.89–92. 
 5. See id. at 995. 
 6. See id. at 997–99. 
 7. Id. at 1000. 
 8. See id. at 100 n.92. 
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This scenario is perfectly fair even though Bella’s $200 excess tax is twice as 
much as her $100 normative tax, and Andrew’s $200 excess tax is only one-
fourth as much as his $800 normative tax. The Inequity Model thus models 
a very particular type of fairness. It is not distributive fairness, and it is not 
procedural fairness. We might call it “dollar-distance fairness”: If everyone 
loses (or wins) to the same dollar extent, then things are fair. 
Graphically, for any arbitrary picture of normative tax liability, there is 
perfect dollar-distance fairness if actual tax liability remains a constant 
distance from the normative tax liability. For example, if the dotted line in 
this graph is normative tax liability, and the solid line is actual tax liability, 
all taxpayers pay more tax than they should, but everyone is the same 










If the dotted line is normative tax liability, and the solid line actual tax 
liability, all taxpayers pay less tax than they should, but again, everyone is the 




 9. These lines look continuous, but they’re not—they should be viewed as many small 
dots, indicating that there are a finite number of possible situations for the taxpayer. 
 10. See Borden, supra note 2, at 999–1000. 
=  actual liability
Tax liability  
(in dollars)  
 
Income
=  normative liability
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Dollar-distance fairness is not equivalent to saying that if two people are 
close to “the line,” they should be treated the same, or almost the same, and 
the Inequity Model does not depend on how close various taxpayers are on 
any axis. It depends only on normative and actual tax liability. In fact, we can 
apply dollar-distance fairness without any sort of axis or line-drawing. If we 
have a list of all taxpayers, and each taxpayer’s normative tax liability, we can 
figure out which taxpayers are further from their normative treatment than 
others. 
III. DOLLAR-DISTANCE FAIRNESS AND LINE-DRAWING 
Nonetheless, inequity in the Inequity Model as applied in Borden’s 
Article does vary with the distance between any two scenarios, because 
Borden’s assumptions force the Inequity Model to tell us about line-drawing. 
In Borden’s application of the Inequity Model, treating two people who are 
close together on the axis very differently does result in dollar-distance 
unfairness, but not merely because the two taxpayers are close together on 
the axis. Rather, Borden includes additional assumptions that are necessary 
to make the Inequity Model about line-drawing. 
Specifically, in Borden’s particular implementation of the Inequity 
Model, both the actual tax liability and the normative tax liability depend on 
the number of parcels of land sold, and the x-axis represents the number of 
parcels of land sold. This is not some strange coincidence; presumably, it’s 
why Borden selected “Number of Sales” for the x-axis.11 
 
 11. See id. at 995–1009 figs.4–11, 13–14. 
=  actual liability
Tax liability  
(in dollars)  
 
Income
=  normative liability
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Because the Inequity Model depends entirely on the definitions of 
actual tax liability and normative tax liability, understanding how those 
terms are defined is key to understanding the results Borden presents. Tax 
liability, in turn, depends on both the amount of gain from the sale and the 
tax rate, so to understand Borden’s definition of actual and normative tax 
liability, we must first understand how Borden defines gain from sale, and 
then understand how he sets each of the actual and normative tax rates. 
A. GAIN FROM SALE 
Borden assumes that the amount of gain from the sale is a linear 
function of the number of parcels sold, and that each square foot has the 
same basis ($1.50).12 Let N represent the number of parcels in a given sale. 
Then 
Gain per Square Foot from Sale = 
2.00	൅	0.01N	–	1.50	ൌ	
0.5	൅	0.01N	
Gain from sale is relevant both to actual tax liability and to normative 
tax liability. Because inequity is determined based on tax liability, in addition 
to tax rate, the amount of inequity will depend in large part on how gain is 
defined. Gain could be constant, or it could be (as it is here) a function of 
the number of parcels sold. If it is a function of parcels sold, that function 
could be, but need not be, linear (as it is here). 
B. ACTUAL TAX LIABILITY 
Actual tax liability depends on both the gain from sale and the 
applicable tax rate. We have seen that Borden defines the gain per square 
foot as 
0.5	൅	0.01N	
for property divided into N parcels.13 The tax rate is either 15% (for sales 
treated as generating capital gain) or 35% (for sales treated as generating 
ordinary income). To implement the model, one must decide where to 
switch from taxing at 15% to taxing at 35%. This should not be a normative 
decision, but rather a descriptive one, because the model is trying to capture 
actual tax liability. Borden assumes that if property is divided into more than 
100 parcels, the 35% rate applies, and if it is divided into 100 or fewer 
parcels, the 15% rate applies.14 
 
 12. Id. at 976–77 & n.14. 
 13. See id. at 1030. 
 14. Id. at 985. 
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The actual tax liability thus increases linearly with the number of 
parcels sold. For sales treated as generating capital gain and subject to a 
15% tax rate, it equals 
ሺ0.15ሻ	ሺ0.5	൅	0.01Nሻ	
And, for sales treated as generating ordinary income and subject to a 35% 
tax rate, it equals 
ሺ0.35ሻ	ሺ0.5	൅	0.01Nሻ	
C. NORMATIVE TAX LIABILITY 
The normative tax liability equals the gain, as defined above, multiplied 
by the normative tax rate. Borden assumes that the normative tax rate 
accurately identifies the portion of gain due to services and the portion due 
to appreciation in property, and that this varies linearly with the number of 
parcels sold.15 In Borden’s version of the model,16 the normative tax rate 
equals 
0.15	൅	0.001N	
The normative rate is thus a linear function of the number of parcels sold. 
The normative rate might also be a flat rate, or a nonlinear function of 
number of parcels sold, or vary in some other way across parcels sold (a flat 
rate for certain parcels and a nonlinear function for other parcels, and so 
forth). 
In the Article, the normative tax liability increases quadratically with the 
number of parcels sold, because the normative tax liability equals the 
normative rate times the gain, and by assumption, each depends on the 
number of parcels sold. Normative tax liability equals 
ሺ0.15	൅	0.001Nሻ	ሺ0.5	൅	0.01Nሻ	
Thus, both the actual tax liability and the normative tax liability depend on 
the number of parcels sold and only the number of parcels sold. 
IV. CONCERNS ABOUT THE INEQUITY MODEL 
The assumptions that underlie the Inequity Model as applied in 
Borden’s Article suggest four areas of concern: (1) the Article’s implicit 
definition of fairness; (2) the Article’s definition of normative tax liability; 
(3) the contingency of the Article’s conclusions; and (4) the application of 
the Inequity Model to other areas of the law. 
 
 15. Id. at 996–97 & n.86, fig.4. 
 16. See id. at 996 & n.85. 
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A. FAIRNESS 
While Borden intends to provide insight about fairness, there are at 
least two problems with the way the Inequity Model defines that concept. 
First, the Inequity Model measures an ideal of fairness that may not be 
intuitive and does not appear to have a strong theoretical basis: that of 
dollar-difference fairness. It is not obvious why we should be concerned 
about dollar-distance fairness. A $100 difference between actual tax liability 
and normative tax liability seems far more significant if the gap is between 
$5 and $105 than if it is between $1,000,000 and $1,000,100.17 A more 
intuitive approach might be to measure the ratio of actual to normative tax 
liability for each taxpayer (or scenario), and then compare these ratios. If a 
model is meant to help our intuitions about inequity, its definition of 
inequity should be grounded somehow—perhaps by intuition, perhaps by 
argument. 
Second, and even more broadly, it is not clear why we should be 
concerned about unfairness related to tax liability for gains. Tax liability is 
based not only on tax rate, which is in the government’s control, but also on 
the amount of gain, which is not. The amount of gain is a function of the 
market, not only at the time the taxpayer disposes of the property, but also 
(usually) at the time the taxpayer acquired the property. For example, if 
Andrew acquired his property for $1.00 per square foot, Bella acquired her 
property for $2.00 per square foot, and they sell their respective properties 
for $2.50 per square foot, Andrew will have more gain ($2.50 – $1.00 = 
$1.50 per square foot) than Bella ($2.50 – $2.00 = $0.50 per square foot). 
Thus, if they are taxed at the same rate, Andrew will have more tax liability 
per square foot than Bella. Similarly, imagine that Bella divides her property 
into 76 equally sized parcels, Andrew into 75, and the market values 1/76 of 
a plot disproportionately to 1/75 of a plot. Bella will have disproportionately 
more tax liability even if her tax rate is the normative rate, and the Inequity 
Model will tell us that the tax treatment is very inequitable. Concerns about 
equalizing tax liability per square foot seem more appropriate for a tax on 
property, not our actual system of a tax on income. 
B. DEFINING THE NORMATIVE 
Borden assumes that the normative tax rate for a given sale of property 
is a function of the number of parcels sold and progresses linearly as the 
number of parcels sold increases.18 But he does not explain why this is the 
normative tax rate. He does not mean that this is the best treatment of 
property sales; he acknowledges that a single rate for all sales, with no 
 
 17. See generally Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 904 (2011). 
 18. Borden, supra note 2, at 996–97 & n.86, fig.4. 
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division between ordinary and capital gains, might be better.19 He does not 
explain why he chooses to operate in the world of second-best, given that he 
can posit any normative world he wants. 
To show how much work the assumption of normative tax rate does, 
consider Borden’s  statement that “inequity would almost completely leave 
the system if the law bifurcated income,”20 such that each piece of property 
were taxed at a blend of the ordinary rate (for the portion of income 
attributable to services) and the capital-gains rate (for the portion of income 
attributable to appreciation in property). This should not be a surprising 
result at all: he has defined the normative tax rate as starting at 15% and 
increasing incrementally for each additional parcel of property sold, so as to 
capture the increased amount of gain due to services.21 In other words, 
Borden first defines the normative tax rate as a bifurcated rate and defines 
fairness as a proportionally small distance from the normative rate. Then he 
recommends a bifurcated rate because a bifurcated rate would eliminate 
inequity. But because the normative rate has already been defined as a 
bifurcated rate, and because the amount of inequity depends on the 
distance from a bifurcated rate, of course a bifurcated rate would eliminate 
inequity—tautologically so. Defining the normative in tax is of course 
tremendously difficult,22 and thus, it is risky to create a model that depends 
so profoundly on how the normative tax is defined. 
C. CONTINGENT CONCLUSIONS 
Borden’s conclusions are unusually contingent on his assumptions 
because of how he defines normative tax liability and gain from sale. 
Because these definitions are so similar, the Inequity Model, as implemented 
based on Borden’s assumptions, can be significantly simplified. Recall that 
the normative tax rate equals 0.15 + 0.001N,23 and the amount of gain equals 
0.5 + 0.01N.24 Based on these assumptions, if one taxpayer with X parcels is 
subject to the actual rate of 35%, and another taxpayer with N parcels is 
subject to the actual rate of 15%, the single-reference-point inequity equals25 
  
 
 19. Id. at 981 & n.30. 
 20. Id. at 1032. 
 21. Id. at 996 & n.85. 
 22. Cf. Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal “Tax Subsidies” in the National Budget, 22 NAT’L 
TAX J. 244, 260 (1969) (proposing that “one could lock forty tax experts in a room for forty 
days, and get no agreement—except as a surrender to hunger or boredom—”about the 
desirable structure of the tax code). 
 23. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
 24. See supra text accompanying note 13. 
 25. You can see the walk-through of the simplification in Appendix A. 
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ฬ1 െ	 ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܺ	 െ ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܰܰ݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅ݒ݁	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܺ െ ܰ݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅ݒ݁	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܰฬ ൌ	
ฬ1 െ	 1000 ൅ 35X െ 15Nሺ0.1ሻሺX െ Nሻሺ200 ൅ X ൅ Nሻฬ	
This particular formula is an artifact almost entirely of how Borden has 
chosen to set both the gain from a sale and the normative tax rate. The 
oversimplification becomes starker when both sales are subject to the same 
tax rate. For example, if both parcels are subject to a 15% rate, the single 
reference point inequity simplifies26 to 
ฬ1 െ	 ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܺ	 െ ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܰܰ݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅ݒ݁	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܺ െ ܰ݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅ݒ݁	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܰฬ ൌ	
ฬ1 െ	 150200 ൅ ܺ ൅ ܰฬ	
These simplifications, and thus the Article’s graphs and some of its 
generalizations, depend not only on how Borden defines fairness, but also 
on the particular definitions that Borden has chosen for gain and normative 
tax rate. 
D. GENERALIZING THE MODEL 
Borden suggests that “[a]fter witnessing the application of the model to 
one scenario, other analysts should recognize how the model could apply to 
other scenarios.”27 To get a sense of the choices needed to apply the 
Inequity Model in another area, let’s try to apply it to, as Borden suggests, 
speed limits.28 
First, pick something that can be placed on an axis and is relevant to 
driving safely. The obvious choice here is miles per hour. 
Second, determine the actual penalty for driving over a particular 
number of miles per hour. This is easier than in the tax scenario, because 
states actually have speed limits based entirely on how fast someone is 
driving.29 Say that the speed limit is 65 miles per hour, and the actual 
penalty is $100 for speeds over 65 miles per hour and $300 for speeds over 
80 miles per hour. 
 
 26. Again, you can see the walk-through of the simplification in Appendix B. 
 27. Borden, supra note 2, at 976 n.11. 
 28. Id. at 973–75. 
 29. As Borden acknowledges, the actual determination of whether sales of land are taxed 
as capital gains or ordinary income is based on more than just the number of parcels sold. Id. at 
979–80 & n.20. 
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Now figure out the normative fine for each mile per hour. This is tricky. 
First, it is not clear what “normative fine” means—perhaps it is the fine that 
deters perfectly? or efficiently? or that punishes certain kinds of speeders? 
Regardless, presumably the normative punishment (whatever that means) is 
zero at some speed, and at some other point it is not zero. We don’t know 
where the normative punishment switches from zero to not zero, because if 
we did, that is where we would draw the line. But of course, this is a model, a 
simplification of the real world. So, using Borden’s methodology, pick a 
speed where the normative treatment switches to a penalty, and then 
increase the normative penalty after that as a function of how many miles 
per hour the person drives. All our results depend on how we define that 
normative penalty. If the normative penalty increases linearly, we will get 
one set of results demonstrating unfairness; if it increases exponentially, we 
will get another result. 
But now things are very confusing. If the normative penalty is in fact 
zero at one speed (say, 30 miles an hour), and is not zero at another speed 
(say, 150 miles an hour), then, somewhere between 30 miles an hour and 
150 miles an hour, we will have to implement a penalty. At this point, there 
will be two speeds close together that are treated very differently—and this is 
exactly what we would hope. Defining the normative penalty as a continuous 
function of miles per hour gives little insight into the actual problem, as it 
seems unlikely that the normative penalty involves every driver, regardless of 
whether he is driving one mile per hour or 100 miles per hour, being asked 
to pay some amount of money that is a function of his speed. The Inequity 
Model is not particularly useful or generalizable if that is the only sort of 
scenario to which it applies. 
So wherever we draw the line, wherever we switch from no penalty to 
some nontrivial penalty, the Inequity Model will tell us that drawing the line 
is unfair. And yet, we must draw the line. Now we get to the tremendously 
difficult heart of the matter. If driving 64 miles an hour is not speeding, how 
can driving 66 miles an hour be speeding? If one grain of sand is not a heap, 
and there is no important difference between one grain of sand, and two 
grains of sand, and so forth, then how can a million grains of sand be a 
heap?30 This is the problem of line-drawing and of vagueness, and it is an old 
and very, very difficult problem that has generated much scholarship over 
the years.31 Borden suggests that the inability to apply his model “may signal 
the law’s failure to identify the purpose for drawing the line.”32 But the 
inability to apply his model to a particular scenario may also signal the 
 
 30. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 31. The nonlegal sources on this topic go back at least to the ancient Greeks. More 
recently, legal scholars have also wrestled with the question. E.g., Frederick Schauer, Slippery 
Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 378–81 (1985). 
 32. Borden, supra note 2, at 1036. 
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model’s failure to incorporate the necessary vagueness in so many terms and 
decisions that the law must address. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Borden’s Article makes a valiant attempt to attack a longstanding 
problem. The Article does not, however, sufficiently justify the assumptions 
on which the model it presents depends, including definitions of fairness 
and of normative tax liability, and it is hard to understand how the model 
could apply to other areas of law without requiring similarly problematic 
and contentious assumptions. The particular model Borden’s Article 
presents is, in short, too contingent to focus intuitions about line-drawing 
and fairness. Nonetheless, the quantitative approach to fairness has 
tremendous potential, and Borden’s ambitious article raises important and 
difficult questions. 
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APPENDIX A 
Gain = 0.5	൅	0.01N 
Actual Tax Liability = 0.15ሺ0.5	൅	0.01N	ሻ	OR	ൌ	0.35ሺ0.5	൅	0.01N	ሻ 
Normative Tax Liability = ሺ0.15	൅	0.001N	ሻሺ0.5	൅	0.01N	ሻ	
X	subject to the actual rate of 35%, N subject to the actual rate of 15% 
Single-reference-point inequity = SRP 
 
ܴܵܲ ൌ 	 ฬ1	 െ	 ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܺ െ ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܰܰ݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅ݒ݁	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܺ െ ܰ݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅ݒ݁	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܰฬ 
ൌ	 ቤ1 െ	 0.35ሺ0.5 ൅ 0.01ܺሻ െ 0.15ሺ0.5 ൅ 0.01ܰሻሺ0.15 ൅ 	0.001ܺሻሺ0.5 ൅ 0.01ܺሻ െ ሺ0.15 ൅ 0.001ܰሻሺ0.5 ൅ 0.01ܰሻቤ 
ൌ	 ฬ1 െ	 0.175 ൅ 0.0035ܺ െ ሺ0.075 ൅ 0.0015ܰሻ0.075 ൅ 0.0005ܺ ൅ 0.0015ܺ ൅ 0.00001ܺଶ െ ሺ0.075 ൅ 0.0005ܰ ൅ 0.0015ܰ ൅ 0.00001ܰଶሻฬ 
ൌ	 ฬ1 െ	 0.1 ൅ 0.0035ܺ െ 0.0015ܰ0.002ܺ ൅ 0.00001ܺଶ ൅ 0.002ܰ െ 0.00001ܰଶฬ 
ൌ	 ฬ1 െ	൬ 0.1 ൅ 0.0035ܺ െ 0.0015ܰ0.002ܺ ൅ 0.00001ܺଶ ൅ 0.002ܰ െ 0.00001ܰଶ൰ ൬
10000
10000൰ฬ 
ൌ	 ฬ1 െ	 1000 ൅ 35ܺ െ 15ܰ20ܺ ൅ 0.1ܺଶ െ 20ܰ െ 0.1ܰଶฬ 
ൌ	 ฬ1 െ	 1000 ൅ 35ܺ െ 15ܰሺ0.1ሻሺ200ܺ ൅	ܺଶ െ 200ܰ െ ܰଶሻฬ 
ൌ	 ฬ1 െ	 1000 ൅ 35ܺ െ 15ܰሺ0.1ሻሺܺ െ ܰሻሺ200 ൅ ܺ ൅ ܰሻฬ 
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APPENDIX B 
Gain = 0.5	൅	0.01N 
Actual Tax Liability = 0.15ሺ0.5	൅	0.01N	ሻ	
Normative Tax Liability = ሺ0.15	൅	0.001N	ሻሺ0.5	൅	0.01N	ሻ	
X		and N subject to the actual rate of 15% 
Single-reference-point inequity = SRP	
	
ܴܵܲ ൌ 	 ฬ1	 െ	 ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܺ െ ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܰܰ݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅ݒ݁	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܺ െ ܰ݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅ݒ݁	ܶܽݔ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݂݋ݎ	ܰฬ 
ൌ	 ቤ1 െ	 0.15ሺ0.5 ൅ 0.01ܺሻ െ 0.15ሺ0.5 ൅ 0.01ܰሻሺ0.15 ൅ 	0.001ܺሻሺ0.5 ൅ 0.01ܺሻ െ ሺ0.15 ൅ 0.001ܰሻሺ0.5 ൅ 0.01ܰሻቤ 
ൌ	 ฬ1 െ	 0.075 ൅ 0.0015ܺ െ ሺ0.075 ൅ 0.0015ܰሻ0.075 ൅ 0.0005ܺ ൅ 0.0015ܺ ൅ 0.00001ܺଶ െ ሺ0.075 ൅ 0.0005ܰ ൅ 0.0015ܰ ൅ 0.00001ܰଶሻฬ 
ൌ	 ฬ1 െ	 0.0015ܺ െ 0.0015ܰ0.002ܺ ൅ 0.00001ܺଶ ൅ 0.002ܰ െ 0.00001ܰଶฬ 
ൌ	 ฬ1 െ	൬ 0.0015ܺ െ 0.0015ܰ0.002ܺ ൅ 0.00001ܺଶ ൅ 0.002ܰ െ 0.00001ܰଶ൰ ൬
10000
10000൰ฬ 
ൌ	 ฬ1 െ	 15ܺ െ 15ܰ20ܺ ൅ 0.1ܺଶ െ 20ܰ െ 0.1ܰଶฬ 
ൌ	 ฬ1 െ	 15ܺ െ 15ܰሺ0.1ሻሺ200ܺ ൅	ܺଶ െ 200ܰ െ ܰଶሻฬ 
ൌ	 ฬ1 െ	 ሺ15ሻሺܺ െ ܰሻሺ0.1ሻሺܺ െ ܰሻሺ200 ൅ ܺ ൅ ܰሻฬ 
ൌ	 ฬ1 െ	 ሺ15ሻሺ0.1ሻሺ200 ൅ ܺ ൅ ܰሻฬ 
ൌ	 ฬ1 െ	 150ሺ200 ൅ ܺ ൅ ܰሻฬ 
 
